True Brit? On Gordon Brown’s Economic Nationalism

If one wanted to encapsulate the current state of the UK’s relations with the European Union, it would be hard to beat Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s decision not to turn up on time for the signing of the Lisbon Treaty (though arriving late for lunch might be seen as an improvement on the twenty or so years it took for the UK to join the European Communties). While we could all be reading too much into what was presented as a “diary clash”, many reports were of the view that his absence was driven by political calculations of what would play in the UK as well as his own ambivalence towards the EU.

It is no surprise that the Prime Minister plays to what is perceived to be the domestic political agenda (whether defined by public opinion or by the opinions of those who own the British media). Yet while turning up late managed to irritate his fellow heads of government, turning up at all failed to mollify domestic critics who still call for a referendum on the “Lisbon Treaty”. Perhaps his absence should be seen as part of a more general lack of engagement on Mr Brown’s part - the European Union does not seem to enthuse the PM very much. Such a lack of interest is not unusual for British politicians.. However but by all accounts Brown was not an active participant in ECOFIN when Chancellor and now it appears that Prime Minister Brown is likewise unwilling to engage in the sort of “networking” with other heads of state which his predecessor was happy to do.

The lack of engagement is puzzling, not least because on economic matters, the prevailing orthodoxy in EU economic policy has been pretty close to Brown’s own ideas on managing the economy (with the notable exception of the single currency). Indeed, the programme of economic liberalisation which has been at the heart of European integration for at least the last quarter century has been one which British governments have encouraged and promoted. Brown as Chancellor and as Prime Minister has been to reinforce the UK government’s support for economic liberalism in areas such as the liberalisation of services and the reform of labour markets.

Yet the way in which this is done, in terms of the engagement with other EU governments, has been less about the common endeavour and more about British economic leadership vis a vis the rest of the EU. Brown tends to assert the UK’s virtues vis a vis the shortcomings of much of the rest of the Union, highlighting the failure of other member states to embrace economic reform in areas such as utility liberalisation or the Single Market. The government has contrasted its own economic success with that of other states, attributing the gap to its embrace of reform by comparison with those who are less willing or able to do so. In particular members of the government – not least Mr Brown – have attacked “economic nationalist” tendencies in some other states.

Such “economic nationalism” is short hand for various protectionist policies – often quite specific actions – to restrict access to local markets. Whereas in the past these policies might have been manifest in trade restrictions, in the current context limitations on foreign investment (in particular hostile takeovers) are the main cause of concern: ad hoc attempts to block foreign acquisitions of companies in “strategic” industries have been particularly criticised. Developments in the EU are often seen as part of a more general global trend towards “economic nationalism” – though elsewhere the interventions are more blatant, taking the form of direct nationalisation – and are equally condemned by the Brown government (as they were by his predecessor). By contrast they claim that the UK is “open for business” with the British authorities imposing few if any restrictions on foreign investment or competition.

Yet might it be that “economic nationalism” is just as much a part of the UK political landscape and particularly of Mr Brown’s ideas? It is possible to detect a strong nationalist strand to his economic rhetoric. It does not take the form of the “economic patriotism” beloved of some French politicians yet in its way it is no less nationalistic.

Arguably Brown’s economic nationalism fits rather well with recent attempts to redefine the term. While traditionally the concept has been defined in opposition to economic liberalism, recent accounts of the relationship between nationalism and the economy (such as that of Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel in Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World, Cornell UP 2005.) have argued for a more sophisticated approach. Not only have many aspiring nationalists embraced the open economy – often to separate themselves from their current political dependencies – but many incumbent nationalists have invoked their economic policies and performances as symbols of their own success. Nationalism and liberalism in other words do not have to be opposing forces. Perhaps economic liberalism can form the basis for a contemporary nationalism?

Arguably this is what has happened in the UK for many years. The trend was apparent under Mrs Thatcher in the way in which she celebrated the success of her economic policies, harking back to the Pax Britannica after many years of the Pox Britannica. Since coming to power in 1997, New Labour has done much the same thing, parading its economic achievements as other regimes in other places might parade military hardware.

Gordon Brown has been particularly keen to highlight such successes both in their own terms and in relation to the performance of other states. He has also been keen to revive British identity and has invoked many of the traditional symbols of nationalism in his pursuit of Britishness. While he has not made a direct link between this quest and the country’s economic performance, it would be hard to deny the latter’s underlying relevance to his case. In a sense the assertion of the country’s economic strength constitutes the “outward projection” of that British nationalism (as well as the demonstration of his own competence as a manager of the economy).
However does Brown (and Britain)’s “economic nationalism of success” verge upon the hubristic? If the UK economy falters we are unlikely to see the government perform a U turn and embrace traditional economic nationalism (notwithstanding the PM’s rather surprising call for “British jobs for British workers” some months ago). But it might give Brown and the British political class pause for thought and prompt a reappraisal of relations with the EU. After all, the UK’s interest in European integration has been strongest at times when its relative performance vis a vis its continental partners has been weakest…

Francis McGowan

Brown's slippery slope?

It hasn't been a good few weeks for Gordon Brown. In the space of a mere two months, Labour has suffered a sharp reversal of fortune in the opinion polls, and now lags behind the Tories by a significant distance, while Brown's personal ratings have plummeted. OK, such volatile swings could very well be an indicator of 'soft' public opinion - ie, many voters may not really have very well defined views on their party preferences or on Brown as PM and could be easily susceptible to the effect of sensationalist media coverage of short-term 'crises'. But I'm not so sure these recent developments can be dismissed this lightly.

For some time now voting behaviour theorists have argued that electoral outcomes depend critically on 'valence' issues - on voter judgements of the relative competence of rival parties and leaders to govern well - rather than on ideological conflicts. In this sense, September 1992 was a hugely significant turning point in British politics, since the currency crisis of 'Black Wednesday' at that time destroyed the Conservative Party's longstanding reputation for competence in managing the economy. Almost immediately, Labour overtook them in the polls, especially in terms of competence assessments, and has retained the advantage pretty well ever since. So is Gordon's bleak autumn New Labour's own equivalent of Black Wednesday? The Northern Rock crisis, the lost HMRC data discs, the allegations of sleazy party funding (how on earth could the relevant party officials have thought what they were doing conformed with the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000?) - and above all, perhaps, the impression of having run away from an election that the party would most probably have won, have all served to damage Labour's standing with the electorate. Vaccilating, bungling and possibly even corrupt: if these impressions stick, the future is likely to be very tough for Labour. Add to that the prospect of the most significant downturn in the global economy for 15 or more years, and the next couple of years don't look too rosy.

Anthony King (Essex University) sets out the trends in public opinion in a nutshell here:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/11/30/npoll230.xml

Matthew Parris has gone so far as to suggest that Gordon Brown might not last the next two and a half years as PM. What do you think?